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B

ooks and articles about D-Day and
the Battle of Normandy continue
to appear in an unending stream but
a number of important issues remain
to be fully explored. This essay
examines the role of First Canadian
Army and its subordinate formations
in two areas that have received little
attention: decisions with regard to
the use of heavy bombers in support
of land operations and aid to the
civilian population administered by
Civil Affairs (CA) officers. The two
issues are intimately linked because
the major challenges facing the CA
organization were products of the
destruction of French towns by the
heavy bombers of the RAF/RCAF
and the US Army Air Forces. The first
part of the paper will show that the
Canadian government – by its own
choice – had no say in Allied strategic
planning in general, and bombing
policy in particular. Thus it fell to
Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar,
commander of the First Canadian
Army in Northwest Europe, to
apply Allied bombing capacity in
support of his forces, the subject of
Opposite: A bulldozer clears rubble from
the streets of Caen on 10 July 1944
shortly after the liberation of the city.
Most of the civilian casualties as well
as the damage was caused by Allied
bombers.

Abstract: The liberation of France in
1944 came at a high cost to the local
populations who were caught up in
the struggle for their freedom. The
Allies’ decision to use heavy bombers
in support of land operations was
made out of military necessity but
it had the terrible consequence of
killing and wounding large numbers
of French civilians. To deal with the
dislocation of war all large Allied
army formations possessed Civil
Affairs detachments which sought
to allieviate the impact of battle on
the civilian populations by helping
to provide the basic necessities
of life including clean water, food,
shelter as well as providing security
and governance where needed.
In the towns of Caen, Le Havre,
Boulogne and Calais, as well as others
liberated by First Canadian Army and
its subordinate formations, the Civil
Affairs detachments were largely
dealing with the aftermath of the
bombing by Allied aircraft.

the following part of the paper. The
remainder of the piece relates how
the Civil Affairs organization of First
Canadian Army organized relief for
civilian populations in areas targeted
by the heavy bombers.
Throughout the Second World
War the government of Canada
systematically avoided any attempt
to become involved in the strategic
direction of the war. Prime Minister
Mackenzie King and his principal
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advisor, O.D. Skelton, were
determined to maintain Canadian
independence by rejecting any
suggestion that they should follow
Robert Borden’s example of seeking a
voice in Commonwealth foreign and
defence policy. The consequences
of this policy were outlined in a
memorandum written by Lester B.
Pearson, then the Official Secretary
in the Office of the Canadian High
Commission in London, who noted
that, “so far as policy and planning
in this war are concerned, our status
is little better than that of a colony.”
Our role, he concluded, was to supply
soldiers and pilots who will be told
where and when to fight “as a result
of deliberations in which we have had
no part…I dislike this role of unpaid
Hessians.”1
Pearson’s memo and similar
protests from other diplomats were
ignored in Ottawa where the Prime
Minister rejected all attempts to
re-create the Imperial War Cabinet
instituted by Lloyd George in 1917.
For King such proposals meant
“responsibility without power” and
he preferred a policy that avoided
both.2 It was therefore not surprising
that Canada was neither informed
nor consulted on the terms of the
Atlantic Charter in 1941 and was
invited to participate in photo ops –
not discussions – at the two Quebec
5
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Prime Minister Mackenzie King (left) and his principal advisor, O.D. Skelton (right),
were determined to maintain Canadian independence by rejecting any voice in
Commonwealth foreign and defence policy. The two men, along with King’s sister, Jennie
Lay, visit Kingsmere, King’s summer home in the Gatineau Hills of Quebec, in July 1923.

Conferences. One result was to place
the burden of upholding the status of
the Canadian military as the national
service of a sovereign state and not
just subordinate components of
Allied formations under British and
American command.
As preparations for the invasion
of France, Operation “Overlord,”
were finalized, Canadian land, air,
and naval forces were integrated
into British command structures.
Both the Royal Canadian Navy
and the Royal Canadian Air Force
would continue to serve in this
manner but the decision to form First
Canadian Army in 1943 reinforced
the Canadian government’s policy
of requiring the Canadian Army
commander to formally certify that
“Overlord” and all subsequent plans
were “feasible operations of war.”3
Even if the government had no desire
to be committed by participation
in Allied military planning it had
a fundamental responsibility to
ensure that large bodies of Canadian
citizen soldiers were not sacrificed,
unwittingly or not, in unduly risky
operations of which Canadian
authorities had less than complete
knowledge.
6
Published
by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013

The existence of First Canadian
Army in the Allied order of battle
raised other questions which many
wished to avoid. An army-sized
formation is made up of two or
more corps which in turn normally
consists of two or more divisions.
Large numbers of ancillary troops are
attached at both the corps and army
level along with medium artillery
regiments, engineers, and much else
including Civil Aid detachments.
Under ordinary circumstances an
Army has considerable latitude
to plan and carry out operations
under a directive from the Army
Group commander. After General
Bernard Law Montgomery was
appointed to command the AngloCanadian 21st Army Group neither
Lieutenant-General Sir Miles
Dempsey (Second British Army) nor
Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar
(First Canadian Army) were allowed
much room for independent action.
Montgomery controlled as many
aspects of operations as he could by
bypassing both Army headquarters to
deal directly with Corps commanders
when it suited him.4
Montgomery had other reasons
for wishing to limit the independence

of First Canadian Army. He had little
confidence in Crerar and would have
preferred to deal with LieutenantGeneral Guy Simonds, whom he
regarded as the only competent
senior Canadian officer and, equally
important, the only one who would
not play the Canadian card if a
dispute arose. Crerar, he correctly
feared, would wish to be seen as
the leader of Canada’s national
army, an aspiration complicated
by the fact that only one of the two
Corps in his Army was Canadian.
Montgomery repeatedly postponed
activating First Canadian Army
Headquarters and initially sought
to limit Crerar’s responsibilities. The
Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
General Sir Alan Brooke, understood
Montgomery’s views but he noted:
I want you to make the best possible
use of Crerar, he must be retained in
Command of the Canadian Army…
You can keep his Army small and
give him the less important role,
and you will have to teach him.
We had the same trouble in the last
war and had to replace Byng by
Currie although the latter was a very
medium commander.5

Brooke’s comment about Byng
and Currie is both inaccurate and
typical of the condescending attitude
of senior British officers. Crerar
would have to learn to deal with
this as best he could. While waiting
for Montgomery to activate First
Canadian Army, a small headquarters
was established and the Civil Affairs
sections of both 2nd Canadian Corps
and First Canadian Army began
their work. Every Army and Corps
in the Allied sector was mandated to
assume responsibility for refugees,
relief supplies, medical assistance,
and other functions during periods of
active operations in their formation’s
sector.6
Ideally, co-operative
arrangements with local authorities
on these and other key questions
3
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such as currency and public finance
should have been in place, but
American hostility towards French
leader Charles de Gaulle meant
that no agreement existed when the
Allies landed in France. Fortunately,
de Gaulle took matters into his
own hands, reaching Normandy
on 14 June and claiming authority
for his National Committee of
Liberation. He appointed a close
associate, François Coulet, as Civil
Commissioner and Colonel P. de
Chevigne as Military Commander for
Normandy. Although full recognition
of de Gaulle and his provisional
government was postponed until

October 1944, British and Canadian
Civil Affairs officers worked with
Coulet and his nominees without
difficulty.7
Montgomery activated 2nd
Canadian Corps on 11 July after 2nd
Canadian Infantry Division arrived
in France. The Corps remained under
British command as part of 2nd Army
until the end of July, taking over the
city of Caen and responsibility for
civil affairs in a city devastated by
Allied bombing. The issue of civilian
casualties from air raids on France
has attracted considerable attention
from historians in recent years. The
publication of Eddy Florentin’s 1997

book, Quand les alliés bombardaient la
France 1940-1945 with its estimate of
60,000 French fatalities from bombing
has led researchers to review the
debate over Allied bombing policy
and to produce important case
studies.8
In 1944, attacks on the French rail
system as part of the “Transportation
Plan” inflicted considerable collateral
damage to town and cities and their
French inhabitants. At the time, the
policy was explained in terms of
preventing German reinforcements
and supplies from reaching the
battle area. Churchill’s protests led
to a decision to abort the operation

US Air Force Photo AC53626

Allied bombers reguarly attacked transportation targets in French towns and cities in the days and weeks before D-Day as a way
of preventing the movement of German supplies and reinforcements to the front. This photo of Argentan shows how the railway
marshalling yard and engine sheds have been effectively destroyed by aerial bombing, but there has also been significant damage
to the residential areas of the the town.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss2/2

7

4

US Air Force Photo AC61321

US Air Force Photo AC52676

and : Heavy Bombers and Civil Affairs First Canadian Army in France, July-September 1944

Left: St. Lô was heavily
targeted by Allied
bombers in June 1944
in an effort to interdict
German movements
towards the battle area.
However, it is clear from
this air photo of a raid in
progress that along with
bridges, roads, railways
and other transportation
targets, significant
residential areas of the
town were also hit.
Opposite: This photo
shows the destruction
of St. Lô following its
liberation by US Forces in
late July 1944.

if civilian deaths exceeded 10,000.
No such reservations were in place
for raids in direct support of the
D-Day landings and the destruction
of towns like Lisieux and St. Lô
on the eve of the invasion was
accepted as an operational necessity.9
Caen had also been bombed on
D-Day and afterwards, but these
events were soon overshadowed
by the decision to use the heavy
bombers to support the land battle
and break the stalemate in front of
Caen. Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris
accepted Montgomery’s request
to employ Bomber Command in
Operation Charnwood, the assault
on Caen, 8 July 1944, but on his
own terms. For Charnwood Harris
insisted on a “bomb line” 6,000
yards from the nearest Allied troops
and selected four map squares (four
square kilometers) in the northeast
section of Caen, well beyond the
8
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ring of fortified villages the British
and Canadian troops would have
to overcome. The bombing added
exceptionally to the destruction that
rendered 80 percent of the city’s
housing inhabitable and killed more
than 2,000 civilians.10 The soldiers
waiting to begin their advance were
greatly impressed with this display
of raw power but none of the enemy
defensive positions were struck.
F.S.V. Donnison, the official
British historian for civil affairs and
military government, described the
fall of Caen on 9 July 1944, “as the
most formidable civil affairs task
yet encountered,”11 emphasized by
the arrival in town of the first CA
detachment in the early afternoon
of 9 July. The massive Allied
bombardment of Caen presented
CA with many challenges. The
immediate need to evacuate 9,700
people, including upwards of 800

wounded, proved to be a daunting
task, further complicated by the
irony, presumably not lost on the
population of Caen, that the same
forces which had brought down
such destruction on their town
were now sending in CA teams to
prevent unrest. The official history
describes the Senior Civil Affairs
Officer (SCAO) in Caen, Colonel
Charles Milne Usher, attached to
a detachment under the command
of Second British Army, as being
consumed by guilt and running “here
there and everywhere in his kilt” to
calm the population.12 The 52-yearold former captain of the Scottish
rugby side, taken prisoner at the
Battle of Mons during the Great War,
educated at Royal Military College
(Sandhurst), and fluent in French,
was not an atypical CA officer.13
The immediate needs in Caen
were dealt with by the formation
5

Canadian Military History, Vol. 22 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 2

electricity or gas; that of a normal

other prison was badly damaged;

population of 65,000 the estimated

the courts were partially destroyed;

number remaining was between

the fire and civil defence services

20,000 and 25,000, of whom 13,000

were without water and lacked

homeless were concentrated in

fire-fighting equipment…

three public buildings, the Lycée
Malherbe, the Eglise St. Etienne

Words fail to describe the anguish

and the Hospice du Bon Sauveur…

of Caen. It had indeed paid a

One prison was destroyed and the

fearful price for its liberation.

prison staff had disappeared; the

However, the civilian morale

Library and Archives Canada PA-138268

of joint CA and French committees,
which also worked together to plan
for rehabilitation. Although there
was considerable concern about the
overzealous behaviour of the French
Forces of the Interior (FFI), it was
widely recognized that French liaison
officers, under the direct control of
the French civil authority, provided
reliable mediators between local
officials and army CA. Although
unexpected, rapid intervention by
the local authorities to advance
the welfare of French citizens set a
precedent for CA in France for the
remainder of the war.
Reports from Civil Affairs officers
provided a detailed description of the
“agony of Caen” which ascertained
that:
…most of the streets were so badly
cratered or blocked with debris
that they were impassable; that
shortage of water was acute and
that it was suspected that available
supplies were contaminated; that
the sewage disposal system had
failed; that there was neither

French rescue workers removing bodies
from destroyed buildings following an air
raid, Caen, 10 July 1944.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss2/2
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This air photo taken on 13 June 1944
shows that the centre of Caen has
been largely destroyed by Allied bomber
attacks prior to the heavy attacks carried
out as part of Operation Charnwood on
the night of 8 July 1944.

was high even through most

Water points had been provided

inhabitants could not understand

for both military and civilian use.

the reason for the severe Allied

Civil labour had been directed to

bombardment of the city. A

assist the bulldozers in clearing

skeleton civilian administration

the principal streets so as to

was available. The refugees were

permit military traffic. It had been

well organized and well cared

ascertained that damage to water

for. Arrangements for the care

mains was not severe and that

of civilian casualties were good

if enough pumps were obtained

despite the customary shortage

from the military sources the

of medical supplies. Health was

water supply could be restored.

extremely good; 20 cases of typhoid

Arrangements were made to

and four cases of diphtheria were

supply these pumps.14

the only known cases of epidemic
disease. Although bread was
in short supply and there were
certain other deficiencies, food
was adequate.
By the evening of the 10th, Civil
Affairs rations for 20,000 persons,
supplies of soap, anti-louse
powder, creosote and chloride
of lime had reached the town.

10 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013
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This was the situation facing the
Civil Affairs officers of 2nd Canadian
Corps on 11 July when the city
came under Canadian control. With
the Orne River in the centre of the
urbanized area as the front line,
the most pressing tasks were to
bury the dead, clear roads, and
remove refugees who now suffered

additional collateral damage from
German artillery fire. “Within a
week over 9,700 refugees had been
evacuated including 800 wounded
and many hundreds sick and infirm
people.”15 Joint French and Canadian
committees were established to
oversee this and other urgent matters.
The Canadian Civil Affairs experience
in Caen established a template for cooperation with French authorities
which proved invaluable throughout
the summer. When the Canadians
advanced towards Falaise in August,
the refugee problem continued to
challenge CA officers as thousands
of civilians had fled south seeking
refuge in what was to become the
battle zone between Caen and Falaise.
First Canadian Army was finally
made operational on 23 July. Brigadier
W.B. Wedd, the Senior Civil Affairs
Officer at Crerar’s headquarters,
worked easily with his French
counterpart Lieutenant-Colonel
P.H. Pierrené, delegating authority
to “spearhead detachments” and
establishing a special section
for refugees. 16 Canadian Army
Headquarters played no part in
the decisions to bomb Caen or its
industrial suburbs, but Crerar and
his senior advisors were determined
to use the “heavies” to break the
German defences south of the city.
Operation Totalize began on the
night of 7 August when 641 bombers
targeted villages that were part of
an interlocking defensive position
manned by soldiers of two German
divisions. Almost all civilians had
been evacuated by the Germans and
most of the bombs fell in open fields,
but the bombing was seen as an
important contribution to the success
of the first phase of Totalize so the
plan to employ the Eighth Air Force
7
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against a second line of defences went
ahead. All but 24 of the 292 American
aircraft bombed accurately but short
bombing killed 65 Canadian and
Polish soldiers while injuring 250
more.17
Despite this, Crerar insisted on
a further bombing effort in support
of Tractable, the second attempt to
reach Falaise. This time 77 of the 811
bombers, including aircraft from
RCAF squadrons, misidentified
their targets and wrecked havoc
among troops in the rear areas. More
than 150 Allied soldiers were killed
and 241 wounded in four separate
incidents.18 This second tragic event
might have put an end to the use
of heavy bombers on the battlefield
were it not for the intervention of
General Crerar. Immediately after
“Tractable” he wrote to Air Marshal
Harris thanking him for his willing
co-operation stating that he remained
“a very strong advocate of the rise of
heavy bombers in closely integrated
support of the army.”19 Harris, who
clearly would have preferred to end

such operations, was persuaded to
continue supporting First Canadian
Army.
Civil Affairs officers dealt with
the aftermath of the August battles
that resulted in “a great deal of
damage to civilian property.”20 The
population had largely been evicted
by the Germans and had found
shelter in mines, quarries, and open
fields. As the spearhead detachments
advanced behind the frontline:
…French Liaison officers proved of
the greatest value. Between Caen and
Falaise, many villages were razed to
the ground and farm buildings…
were in ruins. Livestock were left
unattended and rounding them up
placed an additional burden on the
spearhead detachments who, in the
depopulated areas, were sometimes
forced to do the work themselves.
Carcasses of horses and cattle littered
the fields and roadsides…Falaise fell
on 17 Aug. It was a smoking shell of
a town.21

The refugee detachments
assigned to 2nd Canadian Corps
was responsible for the initial care
of the displaced, providing food,
water, and medical assistance. As
the army advanced towards the
Seine River, “Friends Ambulance
units, French enlisted personnel
and members of the Corps Feminin
(Volontaires Françaises)” took over
responsibility.22
Crerar’s headquarters
was directly responsible for the
operational decisions to employ
heavy bombers on the battlefield and
for Civil Affairs in the Caen-Falaise
plain. On the Army’s left flank a
very different situation developed.
Lieutenant-General Sir John Crocker
and his staff officers at 1st British
Corps headquarters resented their
subordination to Crerar and their
exclusion from a major operational
role. 23 Crocker, an experienced
professional, had commanded his
corps in the D-Day landings and
planned Charnwood, the battle for
Caen, but after 9 July the corps’

Library and Archives Canada PA-132820

Two French women walk through the ruined streets of Falaise, 17 August 1944.
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Will Ogilvie – Convoy in Caen.

task was simply to protect the left
flank and conform to the Canadian
advance.
There was no reason to employ air
power in support of such operations
and most of the towns between
the Dives and Seine Rivers were
liberated without major destruction
or civilian losses. The corps’ Civil
Affairs detachment did not have
to deal with the aftermath of the
bombing of Caen and this may have
contributed to their approach to
planning Operation Astonia, the
battle for Le Havre. Montgomery’s
directive of 20 August emphasized
the need “to secure the port of
Havre very early” as the harbour
and railways “will be required for
the maintenance of the armies.”
Crocker, according to his biographer,
welcomed Operation Astonia, “as the
sort of semi-independent operation”
12 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013
Published

that allowed him to be free of Canadian
Army control.24 His staff drew upon
intelligence from the Army Air Photo
Interpretation Section but Crerar
was content to send his senior staff
officer, Brigadier Churchill Mann,
to the planning conference. Mann
took notes but did not intervene.
Crocker was also authorized to
communicate directly with 84 Group,
2nd Tactical Air Force, and RAF
Bomber Command - normally Armylevel responsibilities.25
Operation Astonia has become
the most controversial battle fought
by 21 Army Group in France
because Crocker’s plans included
the employment of heavy bombers
without any apparent concern for
civilian casualties. The most recent
study of the tragedy notes that “Le
Havre took a greater tonnage of
bombs in September 1944 (though

with fewer incendiaries) than
Hamburg in July 1943…the human
toll of the September bombings
was 1536 dead and 517 missing…
Le Havre ended the war ranked as
France’s most damaged city, with an
estimated 82% rate of destruction.”26
No good explanation has been
offered for the decision to target
sections of the old city which were
not related to the coastal gun
batteries or the forward defences
but Crocker may have hoped to shock
the German garrison into surrender
by a demonstration of raw power.
Arrangements to target the city on
5 September included a follow-up
leaflet raid urging German troops to
surrender. Crocker did meet with the
German garrison commander before
the bombing to explain the scale
of the Allied attack. The battleship
Warspite, RAF bombers, and two
9
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of the bombing that proceeded
the actual attack. He returned to
Bomber Command and produced an
article on “the effect of our bombers
on the outskirts and docks” plus
a confidential report which was
restricted to senior officers of Bomber
Command. 31 Delderfield’s report,
which influenced Harris to oppose
a similar attack on Flushing in
October and to resist further efforts
to employ his bombers against targets
in occupied Europe, was not a factor
in the very different plans developed
for Operation “Wellhit,” the attack
on Boulogne.
While 1st British Corps was
preparing for the assault on Le Havre,
2nd Canadian Corps’ armoured
divisions raced north into Belgium.
The corps’ infantry divisions,
however, were assigned the much
less glamorous task of clearing the
enemy from the Channel Ports:
Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk. The
3rd Canadian Infantry Division
reached the outskirts of Boulogne
and Calais on 5 September and
2nd Division left Dieppe, liberated

without bombing or a battle, for
Dunkirk the same day.
The Channel Ports were heavily
fortified for all around defence
presenting a formidable challenge,
but the newly promoted Field
Marshal Bernard Montgomery was
impatient. His conflict with Supreme
Commander General Eisenhower
over the “single thrust” versus
“broad front” strategy had not yet
been resolved and he told General
Crerar that with “one good Pas de
Calais port,” additional transport and
an increased airlift he could sustain
the advance to the Ruhr that he
hoped to accomplish using the Allied
Airborne Army in what became
Operation “Market Garden.”32 Crerar
told Montgomery that the Canadians
were going “to button things up
properly, taking a little more time
if necessary, in order to assure a
decisive assault.”33 Canadian caution
was influenced by the fact that MajorGeneral Dan Spry’s 3rd Canadian
Infantry Division was to attack
Boulogne with two infantry brigades,
not the two divisions that were used

LCMSDS Air Photo Collection

full divisions supported by two
armoured brigades, the specialized
armour of 79th Armoured Division
and the “Kangaroos” of 1st Canadian
Armoured Personnel regiment were
preparing an assault. 27 Colonel
Eberhard Wildermath refused to
surrender or to evacuate civilians
and on the afternoon of 5 September,
348 aircraft attacked the city with
1,880 tons of bombs. A second attack
on the night of 6-7 September and
a third on 8 September brought the
total to 4,000 tons dropped on the
city before the ground attack with
heavy bomber support on the outer
defences began. 28
Enemy resistance ended in less
than 48 hours with mass surrender
of more than 11,000 German troops.
Crocker offered his thanks to Air
Marshal Harris in a note praising
“the absolute accuracy of bombing
and timing on every occasion” 29
and General Crerar, anxious to
have Harris’ support in the capture
of Boulogne and Calais, sent a
congratulatory message to him a few
days later. These messages led Harris,
or his public affairs officers, to send
Flight Lieutenant R.F. Delderfield
to write a story on this successful
example of close support of army
operations.
Delderfield, who would become
one of Britain’s leading postwar
novelists, was shocked by what
he found. The Civil Affairs officer
Delderfield consulted “stated bluntly
that…an entire residential area of the
town had been razed to the ground”
in the raid of 5 September and
“other residential areas were hit on
successive days.”30 Delderfield later
met with French civilian officials
and British army officers, the latter
praising the accuracy and effect

An RAF Halifax bombs Le Havre on 10
September 1944.

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss2/2
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at Le Havre. Spry’s other brigade was
probing the Calais defences.
Civil Affairs planning for
operations in Boulogne began in
earnest on 7 September, when the CA
staff at 2nd Canadian Corps moved
to the town of Colembert about
16 kilometres east of Boulogne. A
detachment organized specifically to
deal with refugees, and augmented
by Volontaires Francaise, moved
into the vicinity.34 Working closely
with Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Coté,
3rd Canadian Division’s Assistant
Adjutant and Quartermaster General
(AA & QMG), the staff at CA, 2nd
Canadian Corps developed plans for
both Boulogne and Calais. LieutenantColonel Coté was born in Edmonton

in 1903. He was educated at College
St. François Xavier and the University
of Alberta. Bilingual but very much
a Franco-Albertan, Coté worked for
the French language service of Radio
Canada until 1939 when he joined the
Royal 22e Régiment. Appointed AA &
QMG 3rd Canadian Division in early
1943 he was involved in planning the
administrative and logistical aspects
of the division’s role in Operation
“Overlord.” After the war Coté
served in a number of diplomatic
posts including Ambassador to
Finland.35
Of immediate concern to Coté
and the CA officers were fears of a
security leak which precipitated the
evacuation of a ring of villages around

Boulogne. As a result, CA staff and
members of the 219 CA Refugee (R)
detachment, working in conjunction
with the mayor of Montreuil-surMer, his staff and members of the
Secours National, developed an
evacuation plan, and presented it
to 3rd Canadian Division. 36 The
scheme envisioned close cooperation
between several French civil
representatives including the mayors
of neighbouring municipalities, the
resources of the Secours National
and CA. The plan called for the
direction of the population to
evacuation zone collection points,
followed by processing by a CA
officer, members of the gendarme
and a representative of the Secours
Nationale. At that time, the refugees
became the responsibility of French
civil authorities. Food would come
from CA rations and captured
German foodstuffs. The mayor of
Montreuil and a CA officer selected
a number of evacuees to return to
their respective municipalities to
act as security guards. At this point,
the 219 (R) CA detachment received
instructions that the welfare of
refugees was the sole responsibility
of French authorities, but the unit
should be at the mayor’s disposal
and meet with civil authorities daily
to keep abreast of the situation. This
prompted the CA diarist to claim, “it
is a first-rate example of the French
looking after themselves and we
assisted them.”37
A much more difficult task
soon confronted CA and the French
authorities when the German
garrison commander LieutenantGeneral Ferdinand Heim ordered the
evacuation of the civilian population.
More than 8,000 civilians left the city.
Captain J.S. Martin, 3rd Division’s
Historical Officer, described the
stream of refugees:
they glanced at our uniforms and
murmured “Canadiens.” Moving
slowly their brightly coloured clothes
in sharp contrast to their unhappy

14 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2013
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expressions, these people bore
enormous burdens… Small dogs,
some in baskets and some peering
from brief-cases and others straining
eagerly at leashes were plentiful. Few
if any of these people realized that
food, shelter, and transport is to be
provided for them…38

Several thousand civilians had
refused the order to evacuate the
city. When a French Liaison Officer
(LO) provided Lieutenant-Colonel
Coté with information suggesting
an acute food and medical supply
shortage, especially for children, Coté
arranged to have the CA spearhead
detachment enter Boulogne with the
lead troops as a way of informing
civil authorities that food and
medical support would be available
to them on the day of liberation.39
An additional CA detachment was
to enter Boulogne to look after
non-welfare work. Coté insisted
on meeting with the individual CA
detachments to personally explain the
division’s expectations, suggesting
the importance of this exercise from
both a humanitarian and goodwill
perspective. Since CA detachments
travelled with minimum rations and
not sufficient equipment to cook for
everyone, suggestions arose that
branches of the Secours National
should form teams to cook and serve
food. The plan called for civilian
teams, transport and the 219 CA
(R) detachment to withdraw from
Boulogne after addressing immediate
concerns there and go into reserve
for use in Calais; one CA detachment
would remain as the only CA presence
left in Boulogne. By 17 September,
reports suggested that 3,000 refugees
from Boulogne were staying in the
surrounding communes, cared for by
local authorities, using 9,000 rations
per week from the army, in addition
to their own stocks.40
Operation “Wellhit” began
on 17 September when Bomber
Command aircraft struck at the
outer ring of defences. Almost 800
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aircraft obeyed the instructions of
an RAF group captain “who was in
radio communication with master
bomber overhead.” 41 While some
“creepback” inevitably occurred,
the bombing patterns were tight and
accurately placed. When prisoners
were interrogated they reported that
while little damage to the concrete
defences was done, morale was
strongly affected. 42 The battle for
Boulogne lasted for six days and
considerable damage to the city was
done by artillery and the tactical air
force but civilian casualties were
limited.
Although the evacuation and
refugee situation in the Channel Ports
was by far the largest CA concern,
CA staff found themselves working
with French authorities on other nonrefugee matters every day. Much of
the work took place in the communes
and towns surrounding Boulogne,
and in addition to Montreuil, CA
was active in Samer, St. Omer and
Desvres. By 12 September, 2nd
Canadian Corps CA, working
with their attached French LO,
Commandant Mengin, established
civilian medical teams as well as
police and work teams selected from
members of the French Forces of the
Interior (FFI). Meanwhile 150 French
trucks were awaiting instructions to
take food into the besieged city. It is
little wonder the 2nd Canadian Corps
CA diarist was deeply impressed
with the French volunteers: “they
are prepared to look after very large
numbers and throw themselves
into the task of organizing their
reception with enthusiasm and little
reservation.” 43 Displaced persons
were also an issue. While front line
troops battled for Boulogne, CA and
local French authorities spent much
of the week in which Boulogne was
being liberated dealing with displaced
Belgians in Desvres; a colony of 100
Jews in Samer that had survived a
concentration camp arrived alongside
Polish persons seeking to join Polish
forces. Other Poles remained captive

in an FFI prison. Canadian CA
officers specializing in public safety
and a Canadian officer fluent in
Polish assigned to the prison for
vetting purposes had to distinguish
between Red Poles loyal to the USSR,
and Blue Poles loyal to the London
government.44
Once in Boulogne, CA called on
the FFI to assist in some mopping up
operations and to act as an auxiliary
police force. Close cooperation with
the resistance group proved to be
“mostly useful to CA and the army,”45
but working with resistance groups
and other French civil authorities
was not without its challenges for
First Canadian Army. French LOs
had their hands full in their role as
intermediaries. Events challenged
civil-military cooperation, such as
the discovery of a German weapons
cache in Boulogne. More than 50
French Naval firemen with unclear
credentials announced they were
in Boulogne to remove all German
weapons. Coté immediately ordered
the weapons’ destruction. Questions
arose about the viability of supplying
some of the weapons to FFI personnel,
but that met resistance from some
French officials. With disagreement
on all sides, the French LOs tried their
best to come up with a compromise.
Lieutenant-Colonel Coté expressed
dismay that French LOs spent far
too much time on matters such as
these which, in his opinion, were
clearly under divisional control.46
But, in the spirit of cooperation, staff
at 2nd Canadian Corps reminded
Division that the liaison officers
“rendered excellent service in the
past, they had a duty to both 21st
Army Group and their government
and it was not possible to order
them not to concern themselves
with French matters.” 47 Nor did
Commandant Mengin complain
about working with First Canadian
Army despite the loss due to theft
of his car and equipment by two
Canadian soldiers.48 Instead, Mengin
went about his business assessing the
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Above: The original Canadian Army Overseas Photo caption for this image read: “CANADIANS FEED CHILD REFUGEES – These
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situation in Boulogne, and assigning
local government officials to their
new posts in the newly liberated city.
Mengin then rejoined CA and 3rd
Canadian Division to plan the Calais
operation. Only six days earlier,
Mengin had prevented a FFI group
in Ardres from attacking a canal
bridge near Calais held by Germans,
emphasizing that FFI should only do
such operations under instruction
from First Canadian Army. Several
incidents proved frustrating, but
failed to quash the cooperative
nature of civil-military relations.
However, the First Canadian Army
war diarist did make note that a
strong central civil authority was of
great importance as “over-zealous
activities of resistance groups in
France continue.”49
On 12 September the
headquarters of 2nd Canadian
Corps CA moved to Landrethun-lèsArdres, approximately 15 kilometers
southeast of Calais. Even based from
this location, Boulogne was still more
important, but plans for Calais pushed
forward, using the Boulogne CA plan
as a model. Lieutenant-Colonel Coté
insisted on some changes to the
CA plan. Unhappy with the 219th
Detachment’s indecisiveness on the
distribution of foodstuffs, Coté chose
other CA detachments to take on
the responsibility for refugees in the
evacuation of Calais and supervised
the entire CA operation himself. By
21 September, the 318 CA detachment
was at Ardres and had at its disposal
Commandant Mengin and Voluntaires
Francaises for the Calais operation.
The collapse of enemy
resistance in Boulogne allowed
Civil Aid detachments to open
medical facilities, soup kitchens and
waterpoints. Within days, many
refugees returned and the city was
alive again on the road to recovery.
British Army engineers of a Port
Construction and Repair Group
began work the next day as the
Canadians left to get ready for
another siege, Operation Undergo
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss2/2

– the attack on Calais and Cap Gris
Nez.50
The approaches to Calais
provided a sharp contrast to the
hills and forests of the Boulanais
region. The countryside was open
and flat, crisscrossed with canals and
drainage ditches. The 36-kilometre
long Calais-Cap Gris Nez sector
of the Atlantic Wall contained six
major fortified zones including new
concrete defences and strengthened
Vauban fortresses from previous
wars. Pressure from Montgomery
who wanted the Canadians to begin
operations to clear the approaches to
Antwerp meant that the troops who
fought at Boulogne had no time for
rest. On 25 September, both 7th and
8th Brigades began to advance as the
last of the heavy bombers struck the
outer defences. Reports of the limited
effect of bombing on the defences
of Boulogne led to an exceptionally
large bomber mission with over 900
aircraft committed to the attack.
Weather conditions forced two-thirds
of the crews to abort their attack. 51
Neither bombs nor shells did
much material damage and the
battle for Calais required the same
deliberate infantry-armour tactics
employed at Boulogne. Flame
throwers again proved their worth
by helping to clear houses, slittrenches, and especially pill boxes.
The first burst of flame invariably led
to white flags so the key was getting
the vulnerable weapons into position.
The civilian population of Calais,
estimated at 20,000, had according to
German sources refused to evacuate
the city in the two weeks before the
assault began. On the afternoon of 28
September, word that the “German
Commander was about ready to
surrender” reached Civil Affairs
staff and General Spry agreed to
suspend operations while a meeting
was arranged. Lieutenant-Colonel
Ludwig Schroeder was stalling for
time but an agreement was reached
on a 24-hour truce to allow the
civilians, now anxious to leave, to

abandon the city. More than 12,000
refugees fled Calais during the
truce. Civil Affairs detachments
working closely with “local and sousprefectural authorities”52 managed
the exodus without serious incident.
On 30 September, 3rd Canadian
Division was ordered to move north
into Belgium to prepare for an assault
crossing of the Leopold Canal part
of the battle to clear the approaches
to Antwerp. The Canadian Civil
Aid Detachments moved with their
formations and within 48 hours
the Canadian role in the liberation
of France was over. There were no
ceremonies to mark the moment and
no subsequent attempts to tell the
story of their interaction with French
civilian authority.
It is difficult to ascertain with any
authority the failure to tell the story
of Canadian civil affairs in Northwest
Europe. Certainly there was a history
written by Major A.K. Reid, of the
Historical Section, but it remained
a Canadian Military HQ report, it
was not included in C.P. Stacey’s
official history and was only briefly
referenced in F.S.V. Donnison’s
official volume on civil affairs in
Northwest Europe. Concerns did
arise that Reid’s narrative, based on
the experiences of three formations,
excluded much of the CA work
done in the European theatre. Major
A.S. O’Hara, a Canadian civil affairs
officer, expressed these concerns to
Reid. “If your history confines itself to
First Canadian Army, 2nd Canadian
Corps and 1st British Corps it will be
rather incomplete.” It would exclude
“those (officers) attached to 2nd Army
and 30 Corps. In addition, probably
all the outstanding rehabilitative
CA work was done by detachments
and individuals operating under L
of C. [Line of Communications]”53
Also, civil affairs archival documents
reveal that Major Arthur Reid, based
at the historical section in London
after the war, considered himself to
be an amateur playwright, taken by
the London theatre scene, possibly
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at the expense of the Canadian CA
narrative. Civil Affairs files reveal
the following quote from Major A.K.
Reid on 13 November 1945, “This
job seems to be taking much longer
than I had anticipated and I do not
know when I will be finished. I will
not really mind staying in England
until next March or so as I have just
sold the option on a play – written
in 1938 – which is supposed to be
coming on at the Criterion Theatre
about then. And, of course, I want
to be around when rehearsals start
so that my immortal script is not
too mutilated!”54 Major Reid’s last
correspondence concerning the
Canadian CA narrative occurred in
January 1947 where he wrote that he
was “now a civilian and expect to be
writing film dialogues for Arthur J.
Rank.”55
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